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tions with him.I. Introduction
The winds of change are blowing through Europe. In the western
half of the divided continent the European Community (EC) is set-
ting about to complete its Internal Market by the end of 1992, in
the East various members of the Council for Mutual Economic As-
sistance (Comecon) are striving for a thorough reform of their
derelict command economies. Both projects are part and parcel of
a worldwide trend towards freer markets, both are quite sensible
in their own right. Unfortunately, they are incompatible in at
least one aspect that is crucial for the economic future of Eur-
ope as a whole: while many Comecon countries seek closer links
with Western Europe under the heading of "perestroika", a miscon-
ceived "Internal Market 1992" threatens to deepen the economic
division of the old continent.
The purpose of .this paper is to sketch the major causes for con-
cern and to elaborate a concept on how instead a properly design-
ed "1992" could contribute to a pan-European economic integra-
tion. The core of the proposal is (i) to give the emerging "In-
ternal Market" a clear liberal imprint, (ii) to extend the non-
discriminatory treatment to the European Free Trade Assocation
(EFTA), and (iii) to offer EFTA membership to all those East Eur-
opean countries whose economic reforms have progressed suffi-
ciently far.
II. The Economic Division of Europe
At present, Europe's economic division mirrors the continent's
split along political lines: east of the river Elbe, seven Commu-
nist-ruled states form Comecon '; the democratic West is sub-
1) Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hun-
gary, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union. Three developing
countries belong to Comecon as well, namely Mongolia (since
1962), Cuba (since 1972) and Vietnam (since 1978). The arguments
Forts. Fu^note- 2 -
2 \ divided into a group of 12 states ', most of them NATO members,
which make up the EC, and a group of six states ', four of them
4 \ neutral, which collaborate in EFTA; three states on the Balkan '
belong to none of these economic clubs. Comecon is the oldest of
the three groups: it was established in 1949, allegedly as Sta-
lin's symbolic response to the Marshall Plan. Until its official
charter was finally ratified in 1960, however, Comecon had been
little more than a TASS communique (Franklin and Moreton, 1985).
The EC ^ was founded in 1958 (by six states), EFTA in 1960. The
three organisations differ vastly in size and clout. In terms of
population, Comecon comes first (400 million), followed by the EC
(320 million) and little EFTA (32 million); in terms of GNP per
capita, EC and EFTA are roughly on par while Comecon trails far
behind. In spite of its complex network of committees, commis-
sions, institutes and departments, Comecon is basically a talking
shop with no power of its own. ' The institutional difference
between the EC and EFTA becomes obvious when looking at the re-
spective headquarters: the EC is a supranational body sporting a
full-blown administration (20,000 staff) in Brussels, the EFTA "is
a mere trade club with a tiny secretariat in Geneva (75 staff).
Forts. Fu0note
and figures of this article refer to the European Comecon coun-
tries only.
2) Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland,
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United
Kingdom.
3) Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.
4) Albania, Jugoslavia and Turkey. Albania, which is still
formally a Comecon member, has taken no part in Comecon work
since 1961; Jugoslavia is loosely associated with Comecon (it is
represented on some standing committees); Turkey has applied to
join the EC.
5) Until 1965: EEC.
6) In the early 1960s, Romania had blocked Khrushchev's attempt
to endow the organisation with supranational power to take
decisions and enforce them.- 3 -
In one respect, the EC is different from both EFTA and Comecon.
Because of its huge intra-EC trade, the EC's economic exchange
with EFTA and Comecon matters much less for the EC countries than
it does for their partners. Only 10.7 % of what EC countries sell
abroad goes to EFTA, 2.6 % to Comecon, while the EC takes 56.8 %
of all EFTA and 16.3 % of all Comecon exports (Tables 2 and 3).
This asymmetry causes the EFTA and Comecon states to worry that
the EC may largely ignore the repercussion of "1992" on its
neighbours.
III. The Hazards of a Misconceived "1992"
An exclusive "Internal Market" stretching no further east than
the river Elbe would give rise to three unwarranted effects:
(i) Even if the Community's trade policy remains unchanged, the
Internal Market will inevitably put outsiders at a disadvan-
tage. When the cumbersome border controls and the still more
harmful impediments to the free flow of services within the
Community are abolished, suppliers from member states will
enjoy easier access to their partners' markets, suppliers from
third countries will not. In the Internal Market, producers
from, say, Portugal will thus prevail even over those of their
competitors from, say, Poland who are more efficient, but
whose cost advantage is eroded by the preferential treatment
for EC insiders. Economists have coined the term "trade di-
version" for this harmful side effect of regionally restricted
moves towards freer trade.
(ii) Supported by the lobbies of producers, the Council of Minis-
ters and the Commission in Brussels are already busy unifying
norms, standards and market regulations within the EC. Almost
70 % of the 127 "1992"-directives passed so far provide for
such a harmonisation (Dicke, 1989). Uniform norms, however,
which are set from above without having passed the test of
competition can easily be misused as barriers to trade. The
popular "local content" rules, according to which a "European"- 4 -
good must not embody more than a fixed share of imported in-
puts, are but one gross example of such harmful regulations.
(iii) The EC may well increase its external protection and turn
into the oft-cited "fortress", be it to compensate EC firms in
general for the intensified internal competition by less pres-
sure from abroad, or be it to counterbalance the cost push
that the envisaged partial harmonisation of social systems and
labour laws would entail for producers in the poorer parts of
the Community in particular. Such a protectionism would deal a
severe blow to Comecon countries. Their level of development
and, thus, their export structure are quite similar to those
of the EC's poorer members.
Many politicians in the EC who wish to link the demolition of the
internal borders to a prior harmonisation and to a "social dimen-
sion" do not seem to be aware of the most likely effect: an even
deeper economic divide between East and West. Discrimination
against the East has already become a bad EC tradition. In the
years 1980-87 East European producers were, in terms of the im-
port values concerned, six times as likely to be harassed by EC
"anti-dumping measures" than suppliers from elsewhere. ' If, as a
result of a misconceived Internal Market, politicians put even
more protectionist tools into the hands of the Commission, it
would be a great surprise indeed if Brussels did not apply them
rigorously against the East.
The time for the West to forestall such misdevelopments and to
come up with a concept for a pan-European economic integration
instead is running out. Three reasons call for hurrying up:
(i) To chart the course of their "perestroika", East European
reformers urgently need a clear orientation. They ought to
7) Own calculations based on the data in Commission of the EC
(1984-1988), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (1983-1988).- 5 -
know to which extent, in which way, and under what conditions
the West is willing to go along with the intensification of
economic relations which the East wants and needs.
(ii) In the run-up to 1992, the EC is already creating "little
European" facts. These facts will be hard to reverse after-
wards precisely because they are the compromise outcome of an
arduous process of internal decision-making.
(iii) The pull of the Internal Market threatens to draw apart the
very institution best suited for bridging the East-West di-
vide: the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) which, unlike
the EC, has not been overburdened with politics. At present,
the two neutral Alpine states, Austria and Switzerland, and
four Scandinavian countries still work together in EFTA.
So far, it seems that Western politicians have not even started
to ponder a pan-European perspective: the EC is too occupied with
its 1992 project itself and its petty trade disputes with the US;
the smaller fringe states of Western Europe are too frightened by
the prospect of a "fortress" EC to notice their chance of healing
the economic rift between both parts of the old continent. To
avert the hazards sketched out above, the West needs a concept
for Europe as a whole, a framework in which both great reform
projects, the "Internal Market 1992" here and "perestroika"
there, complement and reinforce, not hinder, each other.
IV. The Case against the Dominance of Politics
This concept for a pan-European economic integration ought to be
based on two principles:
(i) Economic activities have to be coordinated by markets, not
bureaucracies.
(ii) Economic integration is not to be confused with or linked to
a convergence of political systems or even the dissolution of
military alliances.- 6 -
The first principle need not be explained at length: the economic
crisis and the resulting quest for reform in large parts of the
East are a clear proof of the failure of state planning.
At first glance, the second principle may appear less convincing
to many Westerners and some Easterners alike. A look at the post-
war history of Western Europe, however, suffices to reveal the
damage which a premature mix-up of economic and political inte-
gration may do (Schmieding, 1988): as far back as the late 1950s,
most states on this side of the Iron Curtain had been in favour
of a free trade zone encompassing all of Western Europe. Unfortu-
nately, French (and German) top politicians refused to include
those countries whose governments were not willing to partake in
a political cooperation under French leadership. Therefore, Wes-
tern Europe split into two trading blocks, the EC customs union,
established in 1958, and the European Free Trade Association,
constituted in 1960 as a loose free trade federation of the neu-
tral Alpine countries (Austria, Switzerland) and five states on
the continent's fringe (United Kingdom, Portugal, Denmark, Nor-
way, Sweden). Only in the 1970s, after West Germany's independent
"Ostpolitik" had sealed the fate of the Gaullist dreams, could
the two blocks come together: those EFTA members wishing to join
were admitted to the Community (United Kingdom, Denmark), the
others were granted free trade agreements for manufactures.
The EFTA states paid a high price for the 15 years of being push-
ed aside (1958-1973). While, for instance, West Germany's imports
from the seven EFTA founding members amounted to 69 % of what she
bought from her five EEC partners in 1959, this share declined to
a mere 28 % in 1972 (Schmieding, 1988, p. 26); only after 1973
could this ratio rise again (1987: 57 %). And while, after having
said farewell to her colonies, EEC-France enjoyed an economic
miracle in the 1960s, the excluded United Kingdom fell victim to
a chronic "British disease" , a malaise which only Margaret That-
cher's bitter medicine could cure in the early 1980s.
These historic experiences with the EEC/EC explain why the Com-
munity's neighbours today take the new attempt at EC integration,- 7 -
the Internal Market project, at least as seriously as the members
themselves. Sweden, Austria and even Switzerland are pondering
whether the economic costs of further trade diversion might not
outweigh the political disadvantages which a renunciation of
their current form of political neutrality would imply. In all
three states (and in Norway) a lively debate on an eventual ac-
cession to the EC has sprung up; Austria is about to apply for
membership soon.
From a pan-European perspective, an enlargement of the EC by
these states would be counterproductive: it would increase the
trade diversion to the detriment of outsiders and thus deepen the
economic division of Europe into a Western and an Eastern half.
To solve this problem, many politicians not only in the Soviet
Union favour an institutionalised cooperation between the EC Com-
mission in Brussels and the Comecon headquarters in Moscow. How-
ever, this would be a dead end: the Comecon bureaucracy has al- '•''
ready failed miserably with its two traditional tasks, namely to
coordinate the economic plans of its member states and to orga-
nise a "socialist division of labour". Intra-Comecon trade is
still de facto dominated by bilateral barter, that is the archaic
form of exchange which, for instance, had brought West Germany to
the brink of starvation prior to the 1948 currency reform. Ac-
cording to the Soviet head of state, Mikhail Gorbachev, the Com-
8) econ members use their intra-trade as a "waste disposer" ': they
try to fulfill their mutual supply obligations with those goods
which they can neither sell abroad for real money nor dare to
dump on their own consumers. Unsurprisingly, Comecon countries
wage tariff wars against each other which make all trans-Atlantic
hassles about pasta and beef pale by comparison. In November 1988,
Czechoslovakia and the GDR, for instance, forbade the "non-com-
mercial" export of many scarce consumer goods to their partner
countries, on 1 February 1989 the GDR opened a new round by
8) Cited by Schuller (1989).- 8 -
banning additional exports and by quadrupling many of her intra-
Comecon export tariffs (Urban, 1989).
The mix of currency chaos and trade wars in the East has made it
plain that Comecon isn't working. An institutionalised coopera-
tion between Brussels and Moscow would, on the Eastern side, pro-
long the agony of an obsolete supranational planning apparatus
and, on the Western side, strengthen all those who prefer bureau-
cratic centralisation to a decentralized coordination of individ-
ual demand preferences and supply capacities via market forces.
On the other hand, a direct entry of Eastern countries to an EC
hoisting far-reaching, if ill-defined, political ambitions is
ruled out as long as a military antagonism between East and West
persists, that is for an unforeseeably long time-span.
V. A Concept for a Pan-European Economic Integration
While a pan-European political unification is out of bounds for
the time being, both parts of Europe may well draw closer econom-
ically. For this to happen, the West has to devise a way to in-
terweave markets (integration from below) without forcing gov-
ernments into a permanent form of cooperation (integration from
above). The very relationship between the EC and the EFTA after
1973 may serve as a telling example: since the free trade accords
for manufactures mentioned above, the remainder of the EFTA (at
present: Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Ice-
land) has turned into a grouping of states which can enjoy a
rather free exchange of goods with the EC without having to par-
ticipate in the "European Political Collaboration" or the econom-
ically and ecologically outrageous EC agricultural policy.
A reinvigorated EFTA unburdened by political aspirations of its
own offers the best starting point for a concept for Europe: the
reform-minded states of Eastern Europe could join such an EFTA
long before the present political and military division of Europe
may have faded away some lucky but far-off day.- 9 -
If the EFTA is to bridge the economic division of Europe and to
reconcile the "Internal Market 1992" with "perestroika", both the
EC and the EFTA have to prepare the ground today. For the EC this
means the following:
(i) The "Internal Market 1992" must not induce any discrimina-
tion between EC and EFTA suppliers.
(ii) For this purpose, the existing EC-EFTA free trade agreements
9 \ for manufactures ought to be extended to services ' and factor
movements, that is to those sectors which the 1992 programme
affects most.
(iii) The EC integration must not proceed via a harmonisation of
product norms, market regulations, redistributive systems arid
labour laws. Economically, a harmonisation by force is utter
nonsense except for some special cases (genuine cross-border
health and environmental hazards). Politically, the present
harmonisation attempts are already close to overstretching the
Euro-goodwill within the Community; it will be next to impos-
sible to impose this harmonisation on a sizeable number of
third countries as well. Instead, the EC should opt for the
superior alternative at hand: the mutual recognition of all
national norms, standards and regulations. In plain English,
this "country-of-origin principle" states that what can legal-
ly be produced in one country can be offered to the customers
in all countries - as long as the label depicts to which na-
tional requirements the product or service in question con-
forms (Giersch, 1987). This liberal principle would widen the
choice and thus enhance the welfare of domestic consumers at
the same time.
(iv) The EC should apply mutual recognition to EFTA states as
well. If the political resistance against this far-reaching
9) An EC-EFTA free trade agreement for services has been proposed
by Senti (1988).- 10 -
Euro-deregulation turned out to be insurmountable, the EC
should, as the second-best solution, demand from its imports
no more than the least restrictive national standard of a mem-
ber country.
(v) The EC should agree to extend these rules automatically to
any state which may join the EFTA in the future. (Sure enough,
special rules for the export of products with military uses
are possible and, to some extent, sensible if these exceptions
are known beforehand and are predictably applied.)
If these liberal principles were put into practice, the Internal
Market would, for all that matters economically, comprise both
the EC and the EFTA - for the benefit of all participants. Both
groups would lift their barriers against each other. Because of
this reciprocity, EFTA members could not justly be accused of
"picking the raisins" on economic and trade policy grounds, a
charge always lingering in Brussels. If the EFTA states do not
want to share in the advantages of a "European Political Collabo-
ration" , they should not have to contribute to the costs of po-
litically motivated but economically foolish EC programmes such
as the "Common Agricultural Policy". The EFTA states would be
spared the awkward choice between their economic interest (parti-
cipation in the Internal Market) and their political freedom of
manoeuvre (f.e., political neutrality). Such an EFTA would no
longer be in danger of disintegration. Instead, membership in
this EFTA would be quite attractive to East European countries:
they could thus gain free access to the entire West European mar-
ket without having to turn their political systems completely
upside down beforehand.
On their side, the EFTA would have to fix clear rules on how far
the economic reform in an East European country must have pro-
gressed before it can be admitted to the club. Three conditions
are indispensable:
(i) currency convertibility, at least for trade in goods and
services, that is on current account;- 11 -
(ii) the freeing of prices, at least for tradeables; and
(iii) no bureaucratic discrimination between domestic and foreign
producers.
These three economic requirements do not go beyond what coura-
geous pioneers of perestroika are already envisaging today. They
are thus politically acceptable. Those East European countries
willing to join would preserve their full freedom to deal with
the ideologically touchiest questions as they see fit: formal
ownership of the means of production of the economically autono-
mous firms could, if desired, remain with the state; the social-
ist countries could pursue that kind of social policy which best
confirms to their preferences and budgetary constraints.
VI. The Benefits of Integration
Naturally, neither the internal economic reforms nor the integra-
tion into the pan-European market need to be attained in one sin-
gle leap. Instead, it may pay to proceed in a series of parallel
steps during a period of transition: this way, the population of
the particular East European country would, immediately after any
of the parallel steps, not only feel the short-term pain of in-
ternal adjustment, but experience the advantages of closer links
with Western Europe at the same time.
The benefits could be surprisingly large for East European coun-
tries in the initial phase already: with the fixed-by-treaty
prospect of less red tape and free access to the West European
market, Eastern Europe is bound to become investors' favourite
location. While skilled people are becoming scarcer and dearer by
the year in the West, the East hosts a vast reservoir of well-
educated but mis-employed workers. In other words: East European
states choosing the EFTA option would, by this very step, make
themselves attractive for mobile capital and thus enhance their
creditworthiness. They could then easily cushion the inevitable
adjustment crisis with imports financed abroad.- 12 -
Our concept for a pan-European economic integration is thus well
poised to impart an additional impetus to the reform process in
Eastern Europe - without giving rise to the political or even
military hazards that could result from a directionless upheaval
in the East. At present, the option of joining a revitalised EFTA
seems to be almost irresistable for Hungary and Poland, and al-
ready quite attractive for Bulgaria and non-Comecon Yugoslavia;
even the Soviet Union itself might be tempted. The West should
extend the offer to all East European states though.
Not only the East would gain if this offer were accepted. A pan-
European market promises vast opportunities for the West itself.
Let us take West Germany, the biggest country on the east-west
divide, as an example. Even the Federal Republic with her tradi-
tional ties to the East today supplies the 400 million customers
in the seven European Comecon states with goods worth merely 7 %
of what she manages to sell to the 300 million people of her 17
West European partners. An immense potential for a mutually bene-
ficial division of labour among close neighbours lies dormant, an
opportunity for welfare gains comparable only to the so-called
"economic miracle" which West Germany enjoyed in the 1950s and
1960s due to her policy of open markets vis-a-vis the West. And
the more the citizens of Eastern Europe are allowed to heed mar-
ket signals and to sell the fruits of their efforts on this side
of the river Elbe, the less will they feel compelled to offer
their labour services directly in the West. It is hardly a mere
coincidence that the pronounced decrease in East-West trade after
1984 (Tables 1 and 2) went along with a dramatically swelling
influx of East Europeans into West Germany.
VII. Outlook
Recently, the EC trade policy has not been famous for liberal
features, in spite of encouraging turns in the consultations with
EFTA and in the cooperation agreement with Hungary. All in all,
the EC does precious little to alleviate the world-wide fear of a
"fortress" EC. On her part, the EFTA has finally woken up to thedes Instituts fur Weitwirtschaft
- 13 -
challenge of 1992 (see the Oslo meeting of March, 1989; Taylor
and Buchan, 1989) but has failed to produce any coherent idea of
how to deal with 1992 and the resulting threat to the cohesion of
EFTA itself. A properly conceived "Internal Market" in which mu-
tual recognition of national norms and practices is introduced
for EC members and extended to EFTA countries would bear a much
more liberal imprint than a "little European" grouping with in-
ternal harmonisation by decree. The experiences with previous
liberalisation successes, for instance with those of West Germany
in the 1950s and of the EEC in the 1960s, support the conclusion
that such a liberal Europe would soon gain in internal flexibil-
ity and thus growth dynamism. It would thus be comparably easy
for the EC and EFTA countries to lift their trade barriers vis-a-
vis the rest of the world as well, be it unilaterally or be it on
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Notes: See Table 2Table 2: Regional Composition of Western Europe's Exports 1960-1988
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aShare in total imports (exports), in %; preliminary results; including German-German trade;
based on IMF data, not Comecon statistics.
Source: Comecon,. various issues; OECD, various issues; IMF, various issues; Vienna Institute,
various issues; own calculations.- 17 -
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